Tesis Pregrado

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Browsing Tesis Pregrado by Author "Almendra Gajardo, Mauricio Ignacio"

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    Actualización del análisis empírico del impacto de las licitaciones de derechos monopolíticos sobre afiliados nuevos en el sistema de pensiones chileno considerando el periodo 2010-2023.
    (Universidad de Concepción, 2024) Almendra Gajardo, Mauricio Ignacio; Parada Contzen, Marcela
    In this thesis, I extend the study by Harrison, Parada, and Villena ( which focused on the mechanism of monopoly rights auctions over new enrollees’ introduced in the 2008 Pension Reform in the Chilean pension system. In particular, I extend the study period from 2003 2016 to 2003 2023. Subsequently, based on the extended period, we assess the impact of auctions on the market. For the analysis, I collect data from the website of the Superintendence of Pensions and the Central Bank of Chile. With the gathered information, I construct a panel database to serve as a basis for linear and logarithmic regressions using the Ordinary Least Squares (method with fixed effects and the STATA statistical software. I estimate four models to address the impact of auctions on the market. I consider variables of interest such as commissions, market concentration, profit margins, profitability, and risk premiums. The results were contrasted with Harrison, Parada, and Villena ( conclusions. My analysis reveals differences and similarities with the original study. When evaluating the price elasticity of demand, we found that in both periods, the implementation of auctions increased an individual’s price elasticity. Nevertheless, the conclusion that demand is inelastic to price remains despite the increase in the elasticity coefficient. Regarding average market fees, considering all firms in both periods, we found that since auction three, they have been significant in explaining a decrease in fees. On the other hand, when I only used never winning firms, the conclusion is that price variation is only explained by changes in the charge for disability and survival insurance. Also, I found that auctions have a statistically significant and negative impact on markups, indicating that their implementation has increased competition in the industry. The impact of auctions on risk premiums is stronger in less risky funds. Finally, we found that by extending the analysis period, the implementation of auctions no longer impacted fund returns compared to the initial period.
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