La solución al problema mente-cuerpo en John Searle.
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Date
2024
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Universidad de Concepción
Abstract
La presente investigación tiene por objetivo exponer la solución de John Searle al problema mente-cuerpo, el cual refiere a la dificultad teórica de dar cuenta de la relación existente entre el cerebro y la mente. Para poder solventar esta cuestión, Searle llevará a cabo un análisis de los supuestos conceptuales tradicionales acerca de lo mental, del cual concluirá que la conciencia es una propiedad emergente del cerebro, siendo esta subjetiva, cualitativa y ontológicamente irreductible, posibilitando así su estudio científico al reconocerla como un fenómeno biológico. Tras ello y tomando en consideración dicha propuesta, se analizará la crítica de Searle a las teorías que afirman que el cerebro y la mente son equiparables a un computador y a un programa informático, respectivamente. Siendo esta una creencia arraigada con bastante fuerza en ciertas corrientes de la Inteligencia Artificial, a las que Searle buscará refutar con su "Argumento de la Habitación China". Tras exponer las razones que entrega este filósofo para dictaminar la imposibilidad de que las inteligencias artificiales puedan llegar a poseer estados mentales como la conciencia, se reflexionará en torno a los aportes de trabajar esta temática en el ramo de filosofía del sistema educativo chileno.
This research aims to present John Searle's solution to the mind-body problem, which refers to the theoretical difficulty of explaining the relationship between the brain and the mind. To address this issue, Searle conducts an analysis of traditional conceptual assumptions about the mental, concluding that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, being subjective, qualitative, and ontologically irreducible. This allows its scientific study by recognizing it as a biological phenomenon. Following this, Searle's critique of theories that equate the brain with a computer and the mind with a computer program will be examined. This belief is strongly rooted in certain branches of Artificial Intelligence, which Searle seeks to refute with his "Chinese Room Argument." After presenting the philosopher's reasons for declaring that artificial intelligences cannot possess mental states like consciousness, the contributions of working on this topic within the framework of philosophy in the Chilean educational system will be discussed.
This research aims to present John Searle's solution to the mind-body problem, which refers to the theoretical difficulty of explaining the relationship between the brain and the mind. To address this issue, Searle conducts an analysis of traditional conceptual assumptions about the mental, concluding that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, being subjective, qualitative, and ontologically irreducible. This allows its scientific study by recognizing it as a biological phenomenon. Following this, Searle's critique of theories that equate the brain with a computer and the mind with a computer program will be examined. This belief is strongly rooted in certain branches of Artificial Intelligence, which Searle seeks to refute with his "Chinese Room Argument." After presenting the philosopher's reasons for declaring that artificial intelligences cannot possess mental states like consciousness, the contributions of working on this topic within the framework of philosophy in the Chilean educational system will be discussed.
Description
Tesis presentada para optar al título de profesor de filosofía
Keywords
Filosofía de la mente, Conciencia (Moral), Inteligencia artificial